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BATTERIES AND STATE LAW:  
A GLIMPSE OF THE FUTURE IN THE LONE STAR STATE 
 
Rich Pepper* 
 
The mismatch of localized electricity regulations with interstate 
electricity generation and transmission creates large inefficiencies. 
It is possible to solve this problem without overturning the entire 
existing regime by affording federal, state, and local regulatory 
bodies more power to implement battery technology without 
traditional regulatory hindrances. Given the limited number of 
regulatory bodies responsible for oversight, combined with the 
uniquely deregulated electricity market, the state of Texas is a 
prime market for the fledging technology. The Lone Star State 
should accommodate battery implementation by allowing investors 
to recoup their invested costs in the technology. Applying lessons 
learned from Texas to nationwide energy markets will help solve 
many of the inefficiencies plaguing the nation’s electricity 
infrastructure and regulatory framework. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the near future, battery technology will disrupt the utility 
market. Texas may offer a glance into this future. The state’s 
largest power line company, Oncor Inc. (“Oncor”), revealed its 
plans to invest billions of dollars by 2018 to install around 25,000 
batteries across Texas to discharge electricity when needed.1 Oncor 
commissioned a study that found the use of batteries should be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* J.D. Candidate, 2016, University of North Carolina School of Law. I would 
like to thank the NC JOLT staff and editors for their assistance with this Recent 
Development, particularly Britton Lewis, Tony Lucas, Nicholas Turza, and Kyle 
Evans. Also, I greatly benefitted from the suggestions of Heather Payne of the 
UNC Center for Law Environment, Adaptation, and Resources and Dr. David 
Gattie of the University of Georgia Engineering Program. 
1 Jim Malewitz, State Law Could Short-Circuit Battery Breakthrough, THE 
TEXAS TRIBUNE (Dec. 15, 2014), http://www.texastribune.org/2014/12/15/state-
law-could-short-circuit-battery-breakthrough. 
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efficient enough to warrant wide-scale implementation in the near 
future.2 Oncor’s interest represents one of the first major moves by 
a large industry player into installing batteries on the electrical 
grid.3 The primary hurdle to this progress springs from Texas’s 
regulatory utility market structure, which prevents a company from 
owning and operating electricity generation and transmission 
assets, and thus spreads the benefits of battery technology too wide 
to allow any utility company involved to gain a return on 
investment.4 Additionally, difficulties relating to battery 
implementation will vary when the technology eventually moves to 
other states, as some states have more accommodating utility 
structures than others do.5 Other states have developed energy 
storage devices, but none have successfully implemented battery 
technology into the grid on a large scale. 
This Recent Development argues that batteries can help 
alleviate some of the current issues with the mismatch of localized 
electricity regulation with national electricity generation and 
transmission, and uses Texas as an example of this possibility. This 
Recent Development proceeds as follows. Part II identifies the 
structure of Texas’s regulatory-mandated utility market, keeping a 
strong focus on the effect this format has on the battery’s market 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Id. This study depends on innovations of leading electric storage companies, 
such as Tesla, who have started to heavily invest in large-scale battery technology. 
Brian Fung, This new Tesla battery will power your home, and maybe the electric 
grid too, WASH. POST (Feb. 12, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ 
the-switch/wp/2015/02/12/this-new-tesla-battery-will-power-your-home-and-maybe-
the-electric-grid-too. 
3 Nicholas Sakelaris, Oncor Proposes Massive Battery Storage Project on the 
Grid with Tesla, DALLAS BUS. J. (Nov. 14, 2014, 10:02 AM), http://www. 
bizjournals.com/dallas/news/2014/11/13/oncor-proposes-massive-battery-storage-
project-on.html. 
4 See JUDY CHANG ET. AL., THE BRATTLE GROUP, THE VALUE OF DISTRIBUTED 
ELECTRICITY STORAGE IN TEXAS PROPOSED POLICY FOR ENABLING GRID-
INTEGRATED STORAGE INVESTMENTS 17 (2014), available at http://www.brattle.com/ 
system/news/pdfs/000/000/749/original/The_Value_of_Distributed_Electricity_
Storage_in_Texas.pdf. 
5 Deregulated markets will better accommodate battery technology, since its 
implementation will depend on market forces rather than the judgment of a state 
public utility commission. This argument is developed throughout the paper. For 
a list of deregulated states see infra note 8. 
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viability. Part III examines how different stakeholders in Texas 
benefit from the implementation of battery technology. Part IV 
focuses on what needs to change in the Texas regulatory structure 
to accommodate battery technology. Parts V and VI extrapolate 
Texas’ problems to other federal and state utility structures to 
better understand if batteries could be implanted easier in other 
energy markets. Part VII suggests possible changes at different 
levels of government to better increase grid efficiency through 
battery implementation. This Recent Development concludes by 
discussing how Texas’s current electricity market avoids many of 
the regulatory hurdles present around the country, suggesting that 
the state is a prime proving ground for the fledging battery 
technology. 
II.  THE STRUCTURE OF THE TEXAS REGULATORY UTILITY 
MARKET 
Texas mandates a deregulated utility market: rates charged to 
customers come from market conditions and are not 
agency-mandated.6 The separation of vertically integrated utilities 
characterizes deregulated markets.7 A vertically integrated utility is 
one that owns a monopoly on every part of the electricity market 
(generation, transmission, and distribution), and is utilized by most 
states.8 In 1999, the Texas Legislature passed Senate Bill 7 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 What Approaches to Retail Electric Market Structure have been Tried in 
Michigan and in other States and Jurisdictions?, MICHIGAN.GOV, http://www. 
michigan.gov/energy/0,4580,7-230-68204_54287-293379--,00.html (last visited 
Jan. 3, 2015). Although, municipalities and electric cooperatives are able to opt 
out of retail competition. ELECTRIC RELIABILITY COUNCIL OF TEXAS, NODAL 
MARKET GUIDE 7 (3rd ed. 2010), available at http://www.ercot.com/content/ 
services/rq/ERCOT_Nodal_Market_Guide_v3.0.doc (citing S.B. 7, 76th Cong., 
Reg. Sess. (Tx. 1999)). 
7 Edan Rotenberg, Energy Efficiency in Regulated and Deregulated Markets, 
24 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 259, 269 (2006). 
8 THE ELECTRIC ENERGY MARKET COMPETITION TASK FORCE, REPORT TO 
CONGRESS ON COMPETITION IN WHOLESALE AND RETAIL MARKETS FOR 
ELECTRIC ENERGY 18 (2006), available at http://www.ferc.gov/legal/fed-sta/ene-
pol-act/epact-final-rpt.pdf [hereinafter TASK FORCE]. Seventeen states currently 
utilize deregulated markets: Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, 
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(“SB7”), which required investor-owned utilities (“IOU”) to 
separate their generation, transmission and distribution, and retail 
functions.9 Additionally, SB7 mandated free-market competition 
between different electricity providers, in which customers may 
choose the lowest-cost option.10 Providers would still operate their 
power lines, as it would be inefficient to allow multiple companies 
to operate overlapping transmission infrastructure.11 Furthermore, 
to prevent favoritism by a transmission company to any of its own 
electricity generation, Section 39.105 of the Texas Utility Code 
forbids a transmission and distribution utility from buying or 
selling electric power.12 The legislature most likely passed this 
prohibition in response to the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission’s (“FERC”) push in the late 1990s and early 2000s to 
ensure adequate competition in energy generation.13 
Understanding the current Texas utility market is critical to 
analyzing the possible implementation of batteries onto the grid. 
Section 39.105 effectively created two competitive markets: a 
wholesale market between generators and a retail market between 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, and the District of Columbia. 
See Energy Deregulated States in the United States, QUANTUM GAS & POWER 
SERVICES, http://www.quantumgas.com/list_of_energy_deregulated_states_in_ 
united_states.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2015). 
9 S.B. 7, 76th Cong., Reg. Sess. (Tx. 1999) (“Not later than January 1, 2002, 
each electricity utility shall separate its business activities from one another into 
the following units: (1) a power generation company; (2) a retail provider; and 
(3) a transmission and distribution utility.”) (codified as TEX. UTIL. COD. ANN. 
§ 39.051(b) (1999)).  
10 Electric Reliability Council of Texas, THE TEXAS OFFICE OF PUB. UTIL. 
COUNSEL, http://www.opuc.texas.gov/ercot.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2015). 
11 Daniel M. Gonzales, Shockingly Certain: Why Is the Public Utility Commission 
of Texas Steadfast in Its Resolve to Keep Texas's Energy Market Deregulated 
Amidst Turmoil?, 10 TEX. TECH ADMIN. L.J. 497, 503 (2009). 
12 TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 39.105(a) (1999) (“After January 1, 2002, a 
transmission and distribution utility may not sell electricity or otherwise 
participate in the market for electricity except for the purpose of buying 
electricity to serve its own needs.”). 
13 TASK FORCE, supra note 8, at 30. A further discussion of this trend can be 
infra Part IV.A. 
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a generator and the final user.14 An independent organization, the 
Electric Reliability Council of Texas (“ERCOT”), collects 
customer’s preferences regarding energy providers, manages the 
flow of energy across the grid to ensure reliability, and dictates the 
market conditions to ensure nondiscriminatory terms.15 Texas also 
utilizes a node structure, which uses over 4,000 points around 
Texas to calculate the market demand for electricity.16 These nodes 
may be an “energy source, sink, or switching station” each with an 
associated cost of electricity.17 Basically, nodes are “points of 
transmission system interconnection.”18 The large number of nodes 
allows a very transparent market, which increases ERCOT’s ability 
to efficiently dispatch resources to meet demand.19 This type of 
distribution allows large and small generators to compete on the 
same playing field.20 Congestion, however, still occurs, and large 
price hikes accompany the use of the transmission infrastructure.21 
ERCOT calculates the related costs of congestion at each node to 
better understand the related increase in price correlated with the 
increased demand.22 
III.  THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF BATTERY TECHNOLOGY IN 
THE TEXAS UTILITY MARKET 
Current market forces in Texas make it attractive to introduce 
batteries. Texans’ demand for electricity is increasing much faster 
than the demand in other states.23 Given this ever-growing demand, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Daniel M. Gonzales, Shockingly Certain: Why Is the Public Utility 
Commission of Texas Steadfast in Its Resolve to Keep Texas's Energy Market 
Deregulated Amidst Turmoil?, 10 TEX. TECH ADMIN. L.J. 497, 503 (2009). 
15 Id. at 503–05. 
16 THE TEXAS OFFICE OF PUB. UTIL. COUNSEL, supra note 10. 
17 ELECTRIC RELIABILITY COUNCIL OF TEXAS, supra note 6, at 7. 
18 Id. at 5. 
19 Id. 
20 THE TEXAS OFFICE OF PUB, UTIL. COUNSEL, supra note 10. 
21 Id. 
22 ELECTRIC RELIABILITY COUNCIL OF TEXAS, supra note 6, at 5. 
23 Sakelaris, supra note 3. However, these predictions are far from certain. 
ERCOT and the federal Energy Information Agency (“EIA”) differ on the exact 
level of growth of electricity demand in Texas. The models range from 0.2% to 
1.8% increase in annual electricity use. This demand greatly influences the 
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regulators worry that energy generators will not build generation 
capacity quickly enough to keep up.24 Any surplus capacity kept as 
a buffer could consequently drop to extremely low levels, or, even 
worse, cause blackouts in certain parts of the grid.25 
Because energy storage is currently very expensive, generators 
around the nation must produce energy almost simultaneously to 
when consumers need it.26 Low-cost batteries offer a convenient 
solution by providing the opportunity to buy energy during low-
demand periods, and then place it back into the grid when a high-
demand for energy exists.27 Additionally, batteries allow wind 
power, one of Texas’s largest renewable sources of energy, to 
become more cost efficient.28 Wind does not always produce a 
steady stream of energy, and batteries can store the energy 
produced when it is not needed.29 
A. Cost and Benefits to Texas Market Stakeholders 
Investors will only invest in batteries when the benefit 
outweighs the cost. The cost-benefit analysis differs depending on 
the stakeholder.30 Market participants who sell energy on the 
wholesale or retail market will reap the associated profit from 
buying energy at low-demand times and reselling at high-peak 
times to exceed the investment.31 This group includes generators, 
transmission and distribution (“TD”) providers, and energy 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
growth (or decrease) in required generational capacity. See Mitchell Schnurman, 
Texas Powers Down, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS (Aug. 26, 2014, 1:02 AM), 
http://www.dallasnews.com/business/columnists/mitchell-schnurman/20140825-
texas-powers-down.ece. 
24 Sakelaris, supra note 3. 
25 Id. 
26 THE REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, ELECTRICITY REGULATION IN THE 
US: A GUIDE 16 (2011), available at http://www.raponline.org/docs/RAP_ 
Lazar_ElectricityRegulationInTheUS_Guide_2011_03.pdf.  
27 Sakelaris, supra note 3. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 CHANG ET AL., supra note 4, at 4. 
31 Id. 
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brokers.32 Because the Texas market allows many market 
participants to sell energy through the grid,33 this group differs 
from regulated, vertically integrated utilities which operate 
monopolies in states.34 The market participants in Texas would 
benefit from the avoided generation capacity associated with 
battery implementation. Additionally, batteries could supplement the 
grid when demand outweighs supply, thus alleviating distribution 
outages.35 Businesses could potentially make significant profit 
during these outage periods, as industrial users lose money when 
not supplied with electricity to run their operations.36 For industrial 
users, the value of lost electricity during these blackout periods 
average around $20,000/Megawatt-hour (“MWh”).37 Since the 
average price of one MWh in Texas hovers around $35, energy 
could hypothetically be sold during a future grid blackout for a 
large gain.38  
Policymakers, on the other hand, can judge whether the 
system-wide benefits outweigh the system-wide costs to the electricity 
grid.39 One such policymaker, the Public Utility Commission of 
Texas (“PUCT”), must include the analysis of “system-wide” 
benefits in its economic policy.40 The societal-wide benefits would 
include: (1) fewer distribution outages; (2) deferred transmission 
and distribution investments; (3) production cost savings; and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 See id. at 4 (stating these market participants include any investors who 
could profit from installing battery technology on the wholesale market). 
33 See THE TEXAS OFFICE OF PUB. UTIL. COUNSEL, supra note 10. 
34 Electric Glossary, MADISON GAS AND ELEC., http://www.mge.com/about-mge/ 
electricity/elec-glossary.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2015) (“Utilities are distinguished 
as being a class of business ‘affected with a deep public interest’ and therefore 
subject to regulation. Public utilities are further distinguished in that in most 
jurisdictions it is considered desirable for them to operate as controlled 
monopolies.”). 
35 CHANG ET AL., supra note 4, at 16. 
36 Id. at 8–9. 
37 Id. at 9. 
38 FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, AVERAGE ON-PEAK SPOT ELECTRIC 
PRICE 2012 (2013), http://www.ferc.gov/market-oversight/mkt-electric/overview/ 
elec-ovr-on-pk-elec-pr.pdf. 
39 CHANG ET AL., supra note 4, at 5. 
40 Id. 
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(4) cost savings from a decreased need generation investments and 
demand-side efficiency measures.41 Customers, the final stakeholder, 
would benefit from the increased reliability, better power quality 
(storage can control voltage), and possibly lower electric bills.42  
The Brattle Group43 completed a study to quantify the price 
point necessary to make batteries a worthwhile investment for 
merchant participants.44 The study concluded batteries must 
decrease in price to $350/kilowatt-hour (“kWh”) to be attractive to 
investors.45 Currently, the price hovers above $500/kWh, but future 
expected innovation could lower it.46 By collaborating with Tesla, 
Oncor has increased its chances of reducing this cost to make 
wide-scale battery implementation profitable.47  
The Brattle Group also calculated the installed battery capacity 
where marginal cost would equal the marginal benefit for market 
participants.48 According to the study, this point exists at 15,000 
MWh of installed battery capacity in Texas.49 Above this amount, 
market participants would not gain from adding additional 
capacity. As the market includes more batteries, the profits 
associated with buying and selling during low- and high-demand 
periods would diminish because there would be more supply 
during the high-demand periods.50  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 See id. 
42 Id. 
43 The Brattle Group is an independent consulting firm advising large clients 
on complex economic, regulatory, and financial questions.  
44 CHANG ET AL., supra note 4, at 9. 
45 Id. at 2. 
46 Id at 7. 
47 Christopher Martin & James Polson, Texas Utility Plans Battery Fix for 
Wavering Wind, Solar, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Nov. 10, 2014, 10:12 AM), http://www. 
bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-11-10/oncor-2-billion-texas-batteries-would-
smooth-renewables (“Oncor has talked to Tesla Motors Inc. about using its 
batteries for the grid. . . . Tesla has announced plans to build a ‘gigafactory’ in 
Nevada that would produce batteries that can supply power to cars and store 
electricity for utilities. The company has said it plans to cut the per kilowatt-hour 
cost of its batteries by more than [thirty] percent.”). 
48 CHANG ET AL., supra note 4, at 8. 
49 Id. 
50 See id. at 5–6. 
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Unfortunately, the benefits of battery technology apply to 
various utility market players differently. For example, energy 
generators may invest in batteries to avoid building new generation 
capacity.51 Their bottom line, however, would not realize the 
additional inherent benefit of avoided transmission construction 
and demand-side efficiency measurements.52 The mandated 
separation of generators and TD providers and the prohibition 
against TD companies selling electricity exacerbate this problem 
by preventing benefits from spreading through parties in different 
operations of electricity generation and delivery.53 The Brattle 
Group argues policymakers should alter the Texas utility 
regulatory structure, so that the overall benefits of battery 
implementation on the Texas grid can be realized by investors.54 
B. The Costs and Benefits the Texas Regulatory Structure Poses 
to Battery Implementation on the Grid 
Texas contains a unique energy market, due to its customers’ 
ability to choose their retail electric provider.55 Most other states, 
with monopolistic, vertically integrated companies, set energy 
rates to cover the utility’s reasonable costs for operating its whole 
business plus a fair return on shareholder investment.56 Texas, on 
the other hand, promotes competition between different energy 
providers, and consequently, generators only receive payments for 
the energy they produce.57 Like any market, different middlemen 
will also add costs, such as a transmission fee or energy-broker 
markup.58 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Id. at 11. 
52 Id. at 17. 
53 Id. at 17–18. 
54 Id. 
55 Sakelaris, supra note 3. Other states allow customers to choose their retail 
provider. Texas, however, is the only state to function as a fully competitive 
energy market where electricity providers compete for the lowest price. See 
MICHIGAN.GOV, supra note 6. 
56 TASK FORCE, supra note 8, at 18. 
57 Sakelaris, supra note 3. 
58 See TASK FORCE, supra note 8, at 58–59. 
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Unfortunately, even though Section 39.051 breaks up any 
vertically integrated company and promotes competition, it also 
spreads the benefits of battery technology amongst energy 
generators, TD providers, and customers.59 In a deregulated 
market, technology must be cost-competitive against other types of 
energy generation for a market participant to invest. If no single 
entity gets all the concentrated benefits, then no one will be 
incentivized to push for change. In Texas’s current system, no 
individual party can enjoy all the benefits.60 For example, 
according to a study completed by the Brattle Group, avoiding the 
cost of new generation capacity will only significantly benefit 
energy generators.61 Thus, only generators would profit, because 
the method of generation does not affect other market participants’ 
bottom lines.62 Any savings passed to energy brokers or customers 
would not be substantial enough to warrant investment on a 
significant scale.63 The Brattle study also found the extra benefit 
given to TD providers (deferred investment and reduced outages) 
would not be substantial enough to warrant the full utilization of 
battery technology.64 To gain the maximum impact from battery 
technology on all of these parties, the Texas legislature must 
incorporate it into the wholesale electricity market.65 
Given the current policy framework in Texas, neither 
generators nor transmission companies can independently capture 
sufficient benefits to justify investing in storage.66 The Brattle 
Group recommends that the Texas Legislature allow transmission 
and distribution companies to invest in electricity storage and 
auction off the capacity to a third-party manager.67 To maintain a 
clear delineation, transmission companies should be able to auction 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 See TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 39.051 (1999). 
60 See CHANG ET AL., supra note 4. 
61 Id. at 17. 
62 See id. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 17–18. 
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off the wholesale market value of distributed storage.68 These third 
parties would then be responsible for scheduling the 
charge/discharge of the storage devices to maximize revenues in 
the wholesale market.69 Transmission companies could then use the 
auction proceeds to decrease the rates customers pay.70  
IV.  OTHER STATES’ REGULATORY ACCOMMODATION OF 
BATTERY TECHNOLOGY 
State utility markets differ greatly in their regulatory mandates 
and actual makeup. Though Texas utilizes a deregulated model, most 
states utilize a traditional regulated utility market.71 As discussed in 
Part III.A, under a regulated model, the vertically integrated utilities 
own the generation, transmission, and distribution.72 Rates are based 
off the utility’s reasonable cost, plus a fair return on shareholder 
investment, divided among all the consumers served.73 However, a 
wholesale market slowly developed over time in the unregulated 
market, consisting of utilities buying large quantities of energy 
from different utilities to serve their customers.74 Wholesale markets 
now mostly serve deregulated models.75 Despite similar regulatory 
structures in most states, the actual makeup of each market differs 
due to states’ different responses to market and regulatory pressures 
in the past. 
 
 
A. Brief History of State Utility Market Development 
The regulated, monopolistic state utility market was the norm 
for many years. Around the 1980s, states began to realize the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Id. at 18. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 TASK FORCE, supra note 8, at 16. 
72 Id. at 18. 
73 Id.  
74 Id. at 19. 
75 See William H. Hogan, Regulation and Electricity Markets, Presentation to 
the Western Power Trading Forum (Apr. 16, 2009), available at http://www.hks. 
harvard.edu/fs/whogan/Hogan_wptf_041609.pdf. 
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regulated model did not encourage efficiency within the utility.76 
Most notably, the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act 
(“PURPA”) allowed non-utilities to enter the market by gaining 
access through the transmission infrastructure and thereby 
competing with traditional utilities providing energy.77 FERC 
forced transmission companies to allow any generator to buy 
access to its infrastructure.78 Consequently, states began passing 
measures to deregulate their utility market in similar measures to 
Texas.79 
Two types of deregulated markets exist: those based on private 
contracts between energy brokers and generators and those based 
on a transparent and published market.80 Markets based on private 
contracts suffer from congestion when the transmission infrastructure 
cannot accommodate all the energy being transported to end-users.81 
This forces transmission companies to hold some of their capacity 
in “reserve” to accommodate unexpected congestion.82 On the 
other hand, transparent markets give clear indications of when 
more generation and TD infrastructure is needed.83 However, 
dramatic price shifts may occur because of the lack of long-term 
certainty in transmission access.84 By 2006, sixteen states and D.C. 
had restructured their retail electric service to include one of these 
options.85 
 
 
B. The Modern State Utility Market 
Utilities in many different types of regulated and unregulated 
markets have begun to divest or transfer their generation assets as a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 TASK FORCE, supra note 8, at 19. 
77 Id. at 20–21. 
78 Id. at 22–24.  
79 Id. at 42. 
80 Id. at 3–4. 
81 Id. at 3.   
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 3–4. 
84 Id. at 4. 
85 Id. at 6. 
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part of restructuring plans.86 Regulators in FERC have launched a 
major push to stop vertically integrated companies from discriminating 
against other energy generators using their transmission infrastructure.87 
Federal legislation encourages independent regulating bodies to 
manage transmission lines88 and prohibits discrimination regardless 
of who manages the TD infrastructure.89 Additionally, the number 
of vertically integrated companies is falling: by 2010, twenty-four 
states had replaced, or attempted to replace, their electric utility 
monopoly system with competing sellers.90 Consequently, different 
companies are realizing the profits from separate parts of the 
market. Investors could have a difficult time making batteries cost-
efficient because they cannot realize the benefits across multiple 
sectors of the utilities market. 
V.  BATTERY IMPLEMENTATION IN DIFFERENT TYPES OF STATE 
UTILITY MARKETS 
Because utilities recoup investments by set rates, battery 
implementation could easily occur in a regulated market.91 In a 
deregulated market, however, batteries will be good investments 
once the price point drops, taking into account all of their benefits 
spread amongst different stakeholders.92 The smaller number of 
traditional vertically integrated companies, however, poses the 
main threat to battery implementation. This divesture is occurring 
in regulated and deregulated markets alike.93 Only regulated 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 30. 
88 FLOYD L. NORTON ET AL., ENERGY LAW AND TRANSACTIONS § 82.04 (2014). 
89 Order No. 888, Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access 
Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of 
Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 
21,540, 21,541 (Apr. 24, 1996) (codified at 18 C.F.R. § 35 (2015)). 
90 Status of Electricity Restructuring By State, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Sep. 
2010), http://www.eia.gov/electricity/policies/restructuring/restructure_elect.html. 
This divestiture was in response to the greater amount of competitiveness in 
electricity markets caused by regulatory pressure in the late 1990s. TASK FORCE, 
supra note 8, at 42. 
91 CHANG ET AL., supra note 4, at 14. 
92 Id at 17. 
93 See TASK FORCE, supra note 8, at 30–31. 
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markets, however, allow market players to regain their costs 
through ratemaking.94 
Additionally, the rate at which utilities buy wholesale energy, 
regardless of the type of market in which they operate, has 
increased over the long term.95 Due to the large quantities 
demanded and the high-price at which the energy could be sold, 
battery-owners would benefit handsomely from an increased 
wholesale market.96 Batteries can even help generation companies 
avoid the costs associated with wholesale markets, by keeping a 
viable source of energy available as a reserve.97 Since a wide-scale 
conversion to deregulated markets is impractical,98 the problem of 
increasing the efficiency of the wholesale electricity market then 
centers on how to allow regulated and deregulated markets to 
seamlessly coexist. 
Inherent factors in the unregulated utility market dissuade 
adequate investment to increase the amount of generation serving 
customers. The two main issues are the lack of long-term contracts 
on the wholesale electricity market and lack of transmission 
infrastructure to accommodate new generation capability.99 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 Id. at 5–6. 
95 Id. at 30. The share of power purchased on the wholesale market by investor-
owned utilities increased from 17.8% to 37.3% between 1989 and 2002. Steven 
J. Eagle, Securing a Reliable Electricity Grid: A New Era in Transmission Siting 
Regulation?, 73 TENN. L. REV. 1, 11 (2005). 
96 CHANG ET AL., supra note 4, at 8–9. 
97 Id. at 6–7. 
98 A national movement occurred in the 1990s and early 2000s for state 
deregulation of electricity markets. It failed, however, due to hesitant states 
erecting “safeguards” to protect against fluctuations new competitive models. In 
actuality, these safeguards undercut many of the free-market mechanisms of the 
deregulated markets and led to their eventual collapse. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., 
Completing the Process of Restructuring the Electricity Market, 40 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 451 (2005). 
99 Eagle, supra note 95, at 4–5. Certain operators have also created “capacity 
markets,” however, to help alleviate this concern. Capacity markets estimate the 
peak demand three years ahead, and then allow energy generators to bid on any 
amount of capacity they want to sell. Then, the operator will sell the energy for a 
“clearing price,” which is the highest amount any generator is paid to meet the 
total estimated demand. Historically, parties implementing demand efficiency 
measures can also bid into the market to sell energy. Adam James, How Capacity 
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Batteries can greatly alleviate these two problems. Batteries built 
close to end-users can alleviate the need to build extra transmission 
lines from generators.100 Additionally, they can supplement the 
delivery of energy to satisfy long-term contracts.101 Furthermore, 
batteries can be used as a necessary reserve to avoid harsh, volatile 
markets or the overload of the transmission grid.102 The main issue, 
then, revolves around how to incorporate batteries into unregulated 
markets. 
VI.  IMPLEMENTATION OF BATTERIES INTO NATIONAL 
REGULATORY SCHEMES 
Batteries can be included in regulated markets as part of a 
utility’s capital cost. Deregulated markets pose a more difficult 
problem given the past failings of states to establish an adequate 
regulatory structure. Batteries, however, actually pose a convenient 
solution for these past shortcomings, and FERC could mandate 
their implantation by increasing its own statutorily-granted power 
over deregulated markets. 
A. History of the Deregulation Movement 
Congress granted FERC the power to manage interstate sales 
of electricity in the Federal Power Act (“FPA”).103 Congress 
enacted FPA in 1935 to fill the gap the Supreme Court created 
when it held that no state could regulate interstate wholesales of 
electricity.104 At the time, interstate electricity was an insignificant 
portion of the electricity market.105 Today, almost all electricity 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Markets Work, ENERGY COLLECTIVE (June 14, 2013), http://theenergycollective.com/ 
adamjames/237496/energy-nerd-lunch-break-how-capacity-market-works-and-why-
it-matters.  
100 CHANG ET AL., supra note 4, at 8–9. 
101 See TASK FORCE, supra note 8, at 4. 
102 Id at 6 (discussing how battery investors can buy surplus energy at low-demand 
periods and then sell it at peak times, thus evening out the any drastic fluctuations 
in prices). 
103 See 16 U.S.C. § 813 (2012) (stating when the states do not control the electricity 
market “jurisdiction is conferred upon the commission”). 
104 Pierce, supra note 98, at 466 (citing Fed. Power Comm’n v. So. Cal. Edison 
Co., 376 U.S. 205, 220 (1964)). 
105 Id. 
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dealings have interstate effects.106 Three interconnected grids 
separately serve the east, west, and Texas.107 
Legislation attempting to level the playing field between 
established utilities and smaller generators accompanied the 
deregulation movement in the 1980s. PURPA gave cogeneration 
plants and small power producers the opportunity to sell to utilities 
if they met certain qualifying criteria.108 The Energy Policy Act of 
1992 (“EPAct of 1992”) expanded transmission access to larger 
energy generators.109 The EPAct of 1992 also extended FERC’s 
authority to order TD providers to “provide transmission service 
for wholesale power sales to any electric utility.”110 FERC enacted 
these mandates into regulation Order Numbers 888 and 889, which 
required non-discriminatory open access to transmission service.111 
The Commission believed open access would be a critical first step 
to establishing competitive markets.112  
Congress then passed the Energy Policy Act of 2005113 
(“EPAct of 2005”). The EPAct of 2005 required FERC to create 
incentives for TD providers to improve transmission capabilities.114 
Additionally, the EPAct of 2005 repealed PURPA requirements for 
electric utilities to buy power from qualifying facilities (“QF”).115  
Finally, Bill Hogan of Harvard’s Kennedy School of 
Government contributed a vital piece of the deregulated utility 
model utilizing a node structure.116 The nodal system not only 
converted the scarcity of electricity into prices, but also includes 
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107 Id. at 465. 
108 TASK FORCE, supra note 8, at 20. 
109 Id. at 23–24; see Energy Policy Act of 1992, ch. 134, 106 Stat. 2776 (1992). 
110 TASK FORCE, supra note 8, at 24. 
111 Id. at 25. 
112 Id. at 24.  
113 Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58 (2005). 
114 16 U.S.C. § 824s (2012). 
115 18 C.F.R. § 292.203–04 (2014) (stating the criteria to be a QF: a capacity of 
80 megawatts or below and waste, biomass, renewable sources, geothermal 
resources, or a combination thereof constitute 75% of its energy generation) 
(repealed in 16 U.S.C. § 1253 (2012)). 
116 Pierce, supra note 98, at 468. 
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the constrained transmission resources.117 The increased prices 
clear the market and signal the need for more transmission 
infrastructure.118 Understanding the location of constrained 
transmission resources is critical to successfully benefiting the 
transmission grid, as “[i]nadequate transmission capacity has 
played a major explanatory role” in many price spikes and 
blackouts.119 
B. Past Woes of Deregulation at the State Level 
California is the poster child for deregulation gone wrong. The 
state began its deregulation process in the late 1990s and attempted 
to create a “California market,” when in reality the state received 
much of its power from surrounding states not adhering to the 
same deregulation.120 The most destructive mistake was the state’s 
price cap on the retail market, which effectively created inelastic 
demand for the wholesale market.121 This meant that the wholesale 
market had essentially infinite demand.122 Given the limited supply 
of generation, prices skyrocketed.123 These weaknesses in the 
system created ripe opportunities for companies like Enron to 
greatly profit by manipulating the system.124 California consumers 
suffered as energy-brokers withheld energy to increase prices and 
profit.125  
A better example of deregulation is the Pennsylvania-New 
Jersey-Maryland Interconnection (“PJM”) region in the Northeast. 
The PJM region stretches across parts of thirteen states and the 
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119 Id. at 483. 
120 Id. at 471. California differentiated its electricity market from those of the 
surrounding states. It did not take into account the differences between its own 
rates and out-of-state prices for energy. Enron, and other energy brokers, took 
advantage of this discrepancy through aggressive market manipulation, which 
greatly hampered the state’s energy market and contributed to its eventual 
downfall. Id. at 471–77. 
121 Id. at 472. 
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District of Columbia.126 The participants utilize node pricing, an 
independent organization operates the transmission system, and 
many vertically integrated companies spin off their generation, 
transmission and distribution capabilities.127 Consequently, PJM 
saves about $3.2 billion per year and generators have increased the 
efficiency of their plants’ capacity to energy delivered from 5–20%.128  
PJM still contains many structural problems. The states in PJM 
interact with regulated markets in surrounding states, which skews 
the economics of operating a purely competitive utility market.129 
These states can also stymie the construction of transmission 
projects through any of their jurisdictions, as many states and 
agencies retain veto powers to block such construction.130 
Additionally, PJM and the surrounding eastern grid created 
artificial barriers between accessing each other’s transmission 
infrastructure.131 These barriers do not encourage market players to 
invest in transmission and distribution capabilities because they 
cannot build large economies of scale.132 This lack of investment 
causes the largest threat to a deregulated market: lack of 
transmission infrastructure.133 Commentators have doomed any 
effort to restructure utility markets, no matter how the market is 
organized, unless transmission capabilities improve.134 
C. Inadequate State Siting Procedures for Transmission and 
Generation 
Between 1986 and 2002, peak demand and electric generating 
capacity grew twenty-six percent and twenty-two percent, 
respectively, while transmission capacity barely grew above the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 Maps, PJM INTERCONNECTION, http://pjm.com/documents/maps.aspx (last 
visited Jan. 27, 2015). 
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interconnection of new plants.135 Several states imposed moratoria 
on installing new generation capacity for fear that local 
transmission grids would be overwhelmed.136 Studies have found 
this stagnation to cost the United States billions of dollars a year 
due to the lack of adequate economies of scale.137 Increased 
transmission capacity benefits the grid as a whole by allowing the 
freer flow of electricity.138 Consequently, increased reliability in 
one state enhances the reliability in the whole grid spanning many 
surrounding states.139 The differences in deregulated and regulated 
markets allow transmission infrastructure to develop at different 
paces.140 While a deregulated market uses market forces to 
determine new capacity needs, regulated markets’ new transmission 
capabilities are determined by a public utility commission.141 
Transmission siting authorities only account for localized, 
intrastate considerations, rather than judging the costs and benefits 
increased transmission capacity has on the interstate utility market. 
States have exclusive jurisdiction over transmission siting.142 
State legislatures establish the meaning of “public interest” and 
“general welfare” for their respective state public utility commissions 
(“PUCs”), which are necessary findings to permit all new transmission 
capacity.143 Examples of factors which prove that a project is 
within the public interest include feasibility, demand for electrical 
service, and practical alternatives.144 PUCs then use these factors to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 Eagle, supra note 95, at 12. 
136 Id. at 11. 
137 Pierce, supra note 98, at 453–55 (reviewing briefly studies completed in 
the 1970s and 1980s which analyzed the inefficiencies of the electricity market). 
138 See Eagle, supra note 95, at 14. 
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140 Jim Rossi, Realizing the Promise of Electricity Deregulation: Moving Public 
Law Out of the Deference Trap in Regulated Industries, 40 WAKE FOREST L. 
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grant permits.145 Some PUCs consider the impact on a whole 
region, rather than just a state.146	   With this mindset, transmission 
capacity can adequately accommodate interstate energy markets, 
which comprise a vast majority of the American grid.147 Other 
states’ PUCs, however, are not authorized to consider interstate 
benefits.148 In 2005, twenty-two states allowed localities to block 
interstate transmission expansion projects.149 Not-In-My-Backyard 
(“NIMBY”) attitudes thus prevent transmission capacity from 
keeping up with new generation capacity.150 This hurts not only the 
state in which the decision was made, but also the entire 
surrounding region using the same grid. 
To gain a permit, a utility must also prove it is satisfying a 
public use, and thus addressing a public need.151 The definition of a 
public need requires, at a minimum, that the solution have substantial 
intrastate benefits.152 States across the nation have interpreted adequate 
in-state benefits to range from “requiring that the project’s primary 
beneficiaries be in-state citizens, to merely requiring the accrual of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145 Id. at 19–20. 
146 Id. at 23 (citing In re New England Electric Transmission Corp., 48 P.U.R.4th 
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149 Rossi, supra note 140, at 647. Commentators estimate these localized 
interests account for approximately $1 billion due to the associated cost of 
litigation, regulatory compliance, and research. Lisa M. Bogardus, Recovery and 
Allocation of Electromagnetic Field Mitigation Costs in Electric Utility Rates, 
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rkets.and.institutional.arrangements.a.perfect.mismatch.pdf.  
152 Eagle, supra note 95, at 16. 
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a substantial benefit to in-state citizens.”153 Additionally, commentators 
have noted that even if regional transmission organizations do 
eventually control interstate electricity transmission siting authority, 
they could still be hindered by not having the power of eminent 
domain.154 
D. State Discrimination Against Non-Utility Market Players 
Additionally, discrimination against non-utilities155 by states 
attempting to block outside competition occurs somewhat regularly 
and creates inefficiencies in the market by stymieing competition. 
Florida provides an example, as the state supreme court forbade 
independent generators from accessing the transmission 
infrastructure.156 The Florida PUC initially granted a third party a 
permit to generate and sell energy on the wholesale market.157 The 
Florida Supreme Court, however, held that a permit to generate 
and sell electricity must correspond to a specific need for 
electricity.158 Consequently, non-utility generators serving the 
wholesale market would not be permitted to operate in the state, 
because there was no corresponding specific need for their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153 Id. at 16. Compare Mississippi Power and Light Co. v. Conerly, 460 So. 2d 
107 (Miss. 1984) (dismissing out-of-state benefits as a possible basis for the use 
of eminent domain and holding that Mississippi citizens must be the primary 
beneficiaries of such use) with Stone v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm’n, 162 
A.2d 18 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1960) (ruling regional integration to constitute a direct 
intrastate benefit). 
154 Eagle, supra note 95, at 42. 
155 Non-utility means generation or transmission providers who are not controlled 
by a state’s public utility commission. 
156 Tampa Elec. Co. v. Garcia, 767 So. 2d 428, 434 (Fla. 2000) (“The 
Commission determined that because non-utility generators are not included in 
this definition, Nassau is not a proper applicant under section 403.519. The 
Commission reasoned that a need determination proceeding is designed to 
examine the need resulting from an electric utility's duty to serve customers. 
Non-utility generators, such as Nassau, have no similar need because they are 
not required to serve customers.”). 
157 Id. at 431–32. 
158 Id. at 434 (“A determination of need is presently available only to an 
applicant that has demonstrated that a utility or utilities serving retail customers 
has specific committed need for all of the electrical power to be generated at a 
proposed plant.”). 
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provided generational capacity.159 The court circumvented any 
dormant Commerce Clause concerns by arguing the Congressional 
intent of the EPAct of 1992 explicitly left power plant siting and 
need determinations to the states.160  
Furthermore, other states make it extremely difficult to build 
new generational capacity through many different means. Very 
similar to the problems inherent with siting new transmission 
capacity, new merchant generation units are often opposed by 
strong local concerns.161 These localized interest groups argue that: 
(1) new generation does not necessarily serve in-state residents 
(Wisconsin); (2) state siting procedures are inadequate (Indiana); 
or (3) new capacity is simply not needed (Vermont).162  Consequently, 
utilities controlling transmission can easily discriminate by granting 
their own generation capabilities a discount on transmission access.  
VI.  SUGGESTED REGULATORY CHANGE 
One of the primary worries about deregulated markets—price 
fluctuations—could be mitigated through battery installation. 
Batteries can solve price fluctuations by storing energy when it is 
in great supply and small demand, and then discharging while it is 
in small supply and great demand.163 State or market actors could 
place batteries near nodes to facilitate the variable market demands 
of an unregulated market. Additionally, this would sidestep the 
extreme difficulties posed to siting transmission facilities. 
Consequently, the main problem confronting electricity markets—
which could be partly remediated by battery implementation—is a 
mismatch of national-sized grids and state regulations. National, 
regional, and state actors should take measures to insure adequate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
159 Id. 
160 Id. at 436 (“We find no merit in the constitutional arguments advanced by 
New Smyrna. As to any alleged preemption or interference with interstate 
commerce, we find that power-plant siting and need determination are areas that 
Congress has expressly left to the states.”). 
161 See Chris Deisinger, The Backlash Against Merchant Plants and the Need 
for a New Regulatory Model, 13 ELEC. J. 51 (2000). 
162 Id. 
163 CHANG ET AL., supra note 4, at 6. 
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regulations promote generation and transmission investment in 
these grids, while also not entirely upturning the status quo. 
A. Possible National Implementations 
Congress enacted the FPA to “fill the gap in state regulatory 
authority that the Supreme Court had created by holding that no 
state could regulate interstate wholesale of electricity.”164 This FPA 
is largely antiquated, as Congress passed it when most of the 
nation’s energy was generated and consumed in the same state.165 
Replacing the FPA would cause massive disruption in the 
electricity market and the economy; consequently, replacement is 
most likely not feasible. Through the FPA, however, FERC has 
jurisdiction over activities solely affecting the wholesale market.166 
FERC has the ability to fill in this gap and supplement wholesale 
activity with battery implementation. Given the ability for batteries 
to simply replace transmission infrastructure, other barriers, such 
as a finding of public need and state veto power for transmission 
construction, could be circumvented by the Commission. 
FERC has already attempted to level the playing field by 
promulgating Order 888 in 1996, which requires non-discriminatory 
access to the electricity grids for generators.167 The Order requires 
public utilities that “own, control, or operate electric transmission 
facilities to provide nondiscriminatory service to all participants in 
the transmission market.”168 The Commission requires public utilities 
to use open-access, non-discriminatory transmission tariffs.169 The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164 Pierce, supra note 98, at 466; See also 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2012) (“The 
provisions of this Part . . . shall apply to the transmission of electric energy in 
interstate commerce and to the sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate 
commerce.”). 
165 Eagle, supra note 95, at 10 (citing Promoting Wholesale Competition 
Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services by Public 
Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting 
Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540 (May 10, 1996) [hereinafter Order 888]). 
166 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2012). 
167 Eagle, supra note 95, at 6. 
168 Patricia Paredes, Recent Decisions of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia Circuit: Energy Law, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 827, 
830 (2005) (citing Order 888). 
169 Id. at 830. 
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Order was an attempt by the agency to promote wholesale 
competition.170 
An odd dichotomy exists in that FERC controls the regulation 
of transmission facilities, but lacks decision-making ability for 
siting considerations.171 The EPAct of 2005 allows FERC to 
implement batteries in “national interest electric transmission 
corridor[s].”172 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
drastically minimized this provision in Piedmont Environmental 
Council v. FERC.173 The court ruled that in promulgating the 
EPAct of 2005, Congress only intended to “make[] sure that there 
is a utility commission available . . . to make a timely and 
straightforward decision on every permit application in a national 
interest corridor.”174 Consequently, given the five circumstances 
outlined in the EPAct of 2005, FERC only has jurisdiction when a 
state commission either is “unable to act or acts inappropriately by 
including project-killing conditions in an approved permit.”175 
Specifically, the Piedmont court completely rejected FERC’s 
interpretation of the EPAct of 2005, which gave the Commission 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170 Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21540. (“The Commission’s goal is to remove 
impediments to competition in the wholesale bulk power marketplace and to 
bring more efficient, lower cost power to the Nation's electricity consumers.”). 
171 Eagle, supra note 95, at 35. 
172 16 U.S.C. § 824p (2005) (stating the Commission may preempt a state and 
issue a permit for the construction of electric transmission facilities in a national 
interest corridor when: (1) a state where the transmission facilities are to be 
constructed or modified does not have authority to approve the siting of the 
facilities; (2) the state does not have the authority to consider the interstate 
benefits expected to be achieved by the proposed construction or modification of 
transmission facilities in the State; (3) a permit applicant is a transmitting utility 
under the FPA, but does not qualify for a permit in a particular state because it 
does not serve end-users in that state; (4) a state commission has withheld 
approval for over one year; or (5) the state commission has conditioned its 
approval to make the project not economically feasible or will not significantly 
reduce transmission congestion in interstate commerce). 
173 558 F.3d 304 (4th Cir. 2009). 
174 Id. at 314. 
175 Id. 
16 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 269, 293 
Batteries and State Law 
 
	  
permitting authority if a state denied a permit.176 Based on the plain 
meaning of the words in the statute and the inclusion of numerous 
limiting conditions, the majority concluded that Congress meant to 
grant very limited permitting backstop authority to FERC.177 
However, much evidence exists to make the Congressional intent 
less clear. First, as the Piedmont dissent notes, a study completed 
by the Department of Energy for the EPAct of 2005 specifically 
noted “FERC should act if state and regional bodies are 
unsuccessful in siting and permitting national interest transmission 
lines.”178  
Additionally, a House Report on its version of the bill, which 
contained identical language as the Act eventually passed, granted 
the authority to FERC if “after one year, a state, or other approval 
authority is unable or refuses to site the line.”179 Even the 
dissenting views in the House recognized the Act’s authority to 
“eliminate[] . . . deference to the States in decisions about the 
siting of transmission lines. . . .”180 Finally, a Senate Report 
recognized the Bill to authorize FERC permitting power over 
transmission facilities if a state withholds a permit 
“inappropriately.”181 These pieces of legislative history could easily 
signify Congress’s intent to grant FERC transmission permitting 
power if a state PUC denies a permit. If not, these statements at 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
176 Id. at 313 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 216(b)(1)(C)(i) (2006) (focusing the statutory 
meaning of the language granting permitting authority to FERC after a state 
PUC “withheld approval for more than 1 year after the filing of [a permit] 
application”). 
177 Id. at 313–15 (analyzing the meaning of “withheld” and the four instances 
in the statute where Congress gives FERC power to control transmission siting). 
178 Id. at 321 (quoting U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, NATIONAL TRANSMISSION GRID 
STUDY 58–59 (May 2002), available at http://www.ferc.gove/industries/electric/ 
gen-info/transmission-grid.pdf). 
179 Id. at 325 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 109-215(I), at 261 (2005)). 
180 Id. (citing 151 CONG. REC. H2193 (daily ed. Apr. 20, 2005) (statement of 
Rep. Dingel)). 
181 Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 109-78, at 5 (2005)). 
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least signify enough Congressional ambiguity to grant FERC 
Chevron deference.182 
Congress could help alleviate this uncertainty by passing 
another statute explicitly stating its intent to give FERC such 
power. If this new statute included similar language to the EPAct 
of 2005, federal preemption could exist in regards to state 
determinations of need, because the statute grants transmission 
siting authorization if the Commission determines it is “consistent 
with the public interest.”183 This power could greatly replace the 
localized power over transmission siting, and instead allow a 
national commission to consider the benefits to the interconnected 
grid spanning many states. This type of permitting would almost 
eliminate NIMBY concerns by allowing the Commission to 
balance localized effects of the transmission infrastructure with 
increased capacity of electricity transportation. However, increased 
national transmission permitting would not solve the problems 
inherent in Tampa Elec. Co. v. Garcia,184 where a state political 
branch disallowed extra generation capacity.185 Wholesale 
electricity generation, which technically could flow through the 
grid into other states, would be a further stretch for nationalized 
control, and may be seen as encroaching too far into traditional 
state power. 
FERC could also use a dormant Commerce Clause argument, 
which was quickly disregarded in Tampa Bay,186 to prove federal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182 Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 
(1984) (stating a court should use “traditional tools of statutory construction,” 
which includes legislative history, to judge the intent of Congress and, if the 
intent of Congress is ambiguous, then deference should be afforded to the 
applicable agency as long as their interpretation of the statute is permissible, 
which is a low bar).  
183 16 U.S.C. § 824p(b)(1)(B) (2006). 
184 767 So. 2d 428 (Fla. 2000). 
185 Id. 
186 Tampa Elec. Co. v. Garcia, 767 So. 2d 428, 436 (Fla. 2000) (“We find no 
merit in the constitutional arguments advanced by New Smyrna. As to any 
alleged preemption or interference with interstate commerce, we find that 
power-plant siting and need determination are areas that Congress has expressly 
left to the states.”). 
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jurisdiction over wholesale energy generation. The Supreme Court 
has interpreted the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution187 to 
restrict states from engaging in economic protectionist behavior 
that discriminates against or burdens interstate commerce.188 A 
state law is discriminatory if it is “facially discriminatory, has a 
discriminatory purpose, or is discriminatory in effect.”189 If a court 
determines no discriminatory component exists, then it will apply a 
flexible balancing approach, called the “Pike Balancing Test,” that 
weighs whether the burdens on interstate commerce are “clearly 
excessive” compared to local benefits.190 
 A state denial of extra transmission or generation capacity 
could be seen to conflict with the dormant Commerce Clause. A 
denial of generation and transmission capacity growth affects both 
the denying state and the surrounding states on the grid, so it is 
unlikely that would be found to be discriminatory. In applying the 
Pike balancing test, however, a court could find a lack of 
transmission and generation capacity in interstate electricity 
markets to clearly exceed the local benefits. This is especially true 
in regards to transmission siting, as a lack of transmission 
capabilities has been viewed191 to plague the nation’s electricity 
market. A lack of transmission infrastructure could be seen as 
providing a large burden to interstate electricity commerce. Given 
the lack of serious negative effects from transmission siting,192 a 
court could conclude a state decision to not grant a permit for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
187 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
188 Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 522 (1935). 
189 Alexandra Klass & Elizabeth Healey, Energy Policy, Extraterritoriality, 
and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 5 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 
127, 131 (2014) (citing Daniel K. Lee & Timothy P. Duane, Putting the 
Dormant Commerce Clause Back to Sleep: Adapting the Doctrine to Support 
State Renewable Portfolio Standards, 43 ENVTL. L. 295, 300–02 (2013)); See 
SDDS, Inc. v. South Dakota, 47 F.3d 263, 267 (8th Cir. 1995). 
190 Klass, supra note 189, at 131 (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 
137, 142 (1970)). 
191 Pierce, supra note 98, at 469. 
192 Environmental Impacts of Transmission Lines, PUB. UTIL. COMM’N OF WISC. 
(2013), available at http://psc.wi.gov/thelibrary/publications/electric/electric10.pdf 
(explaining how many of the feared effects from nearby transmission infrastructure 
do not exist or, if they do exist, can be greatly mitigated). 
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transmission siting violates the dormant Commerce Clause. A 
denial of increased generational capacity would be a different story 
given the serious localized concerns accompanying generation 
facilities such as pollution and possible health effects. Any damage 
to interstate commerce by avoided generational capacity would 
most likely not outweigh the serious localized concerns in 
increasing generational capacity.193 
A distinction would also have to be made between the facial 
language of a statute and how that language is applied. Both are 
judged the same way as to whether they manifest as an undue 
burden on interstate commerce. A state’s criteria for determining a 
public need are not discriminatory, as they only focus on in-state 
benefits from a proposed project. A state’s PUC or judiciary’s 
judgment of the criteria to a specific permitting action, however, 
could put an excessive burden on interstate commerce. This could 
occur when a state denies extra transmission capacity to avoid a 
relatively small localized inconvenience, and completely 
disregards the interstate need to alleviate transmission congestion. 
Finally, Congress should reinstate the part of PURPA dealing 
with QFs and allow them to start selling energy to utilities again. 
QFs were created to accommodate moderately sized renewable 
energy sources. Batteries supplement these modes of generation by 
allowing their energy production to be dictated by non-natural 
factors. Furthermore, under the repealed PURPA language, 
batteries would qualify as a QF if the respective generation 
facilities do not have a capacity over 80 MW.194 
B. Possible Regional Implementations 
Critics of the status quo have noted the ability of regional 
transmission organizations (“RTOs”) to manage access to 
electricity grids could reduce the opportunities for undue 
discrimination.195 In fact, that was FERC’s primary objective in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
193 C.L. Comar & L.A. Sagan, Health Effects of Energy Production and 
Conversion, 1 ANN. REV. OF ENERGY 581 (1976). 
194 See 16 C.F.R. § 292.203–04 (2010). 
195 NORTON, supra note 88. 
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Order 2000: requiring all transmission-owning entities to 
voluntarily place their transmission facilities under the control of 
such organizations.196 The Commission noted that functional 
unbundling had not solved undue discrimination by TD owners.197 
Even though the Commission thought RTOs were “necessary to 
remedy impediments to competitive markets,” they still decided 
not to make them mandatory for transmission markets across the 
nation.198 
Given the past issues with states such as California and Florida, 
the FERC should alter Order 2000 to force states to form RTOs. 
These organizations would be able to ensure equal access to all 
different types of generators. Though they would not have real 
power over transmission siting, they could still ensure a clear 
market to help identify constrained transmission resources. 
Additionally, given this lack of siting authority, batteries could 
supplement the constrained transmission resources especially in 
regions with many substations available to upload and download 
energy. Batteries could simply be placed near a bottleneck in the 
grid to help alleviate the pressure.199 
The great benefits of batteries to RTOs would be in the 
utilization of renewable energy. Given the fluctuations in power 
that sources like solar and wind provide, batteries can help harness 
all of the energy provided from these sources. Energy output from 
these sources greatly depends on the time of day, and historically 
these sources have not been able to reach their full potential due to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
196 Id. 
197 Id. (noting that unbundling was not the answer due to: (1) administrative 
difficulty; (2) increase in the number and frequency of allegations regarding 
discriminatory treatment; and (3) difficult in monitoring the applicable requirement 
standards). 
198 Id. 
199 It should be noted that batteries distributed across the grid could not totally 
replace transmission infrastructure development in the foreseeable future. In 
fact, the amount of power they can provide are orders of magnitude different. 
Batteries can provide about 2 MWh when charged, while a normal transmission 
line can provide about 2,000 MWh all the time. Telephone Interview with 
Charlie Mathys, Business Development Manager, Landis + Gyr (Feb. 6, 2015) 
(on file with author). 
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the mismatch of their energy production to peak demand.200 With 
battery implementation, a large amount of renewable capacity 
would suddenly become available and help alleviate many 
generation capacity concerns. Of course, the presence of an RTO is 
not required for batteries to be implemented. An RTO, however, 
would help ensure the integrity of access to a transmission grid, 
and thus would not discriminate against smaller, renewable energy 
operations attempting to become connected. 
C. Possible Local Implementations 
Given the statutory framework outlined above, states control a 
large amount of generation and transmission siting capability. 
Through the FPA, EPAct of 1992, and Piedmont Court’s 
interpretation of the EPAct of 2005, states seem to control 
everything but interstate wholesale markets. Even the federal 
government’s control over the wholesale market even seems 
limited, given that FERC only has decision-making ability when a 
state PUC does not make a decision.201 
If an adequate RTO cannot be developed, then it falls to the 
states to start considering benefits outside of localized 
considerations. Transmission siting, even if it only marginally 
increases the amount of transmission capacity in one state, still 
benefits the entire grid by decreasing bottlenecks in the flow of 
energy.202 One imaginative way the federal government could 
encourage a decrease transmission congestion is to start enforcing 
the dormant Commerce Clause against states refusing to allow 
increased transmission capacity on a grid in which they are 
connected.  
Additionally, state courts should start using a looser standard of 
state benefit to establish a finding of public need. In fact, many 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
200 Charles Vartanian, Grid Stability Systems for Renewable Energy Success, 
A123 SYSTEMS, http://www.neces.com/assets/Grid-Stability-Battery-Systems-for-
Renewable-Energy-Success1.pdf (last visited Mar. 17, 2015). 
201 16 U.S.C. § 216(b)(1)(C)(i) (2006); see Piedmont Envtl. Council v. FERC, 
558 F.3d 304 (4th Cir. 2009). 
202 Eagle, supra note 95, at 12 (“Because electricity moves along all available 
paths once introduced into the power grid, every flow of electricity affects the 
entire distribution network.”). 
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western states’ courts have found indirect benefits, such as 
increased grid reliability, to constitute a constitutionally valid 
public use.203 This looser standard would be more difficult to 
expand to other states given the traditional localized interests in 
halting such projects. 
These national, regional, and local options, however, could 
come to fruition. Given the past deference to state and localized 
concerns, courts could strike down any constitutional challenge or 
policy argument against the status quo. Also, to protect localized 
concerns, states and localities could continue their stagnation in 
changing the norm. If the status quo prevails, batteries can help 
alleviate the issue of bottleneck in transmission capacity and 
interstate benefits. Batteries can help benefit local operations by 
providing energy to specific sources and also avoiding the cost of 
extra transmission capacity. A finding of public need for 
permitting will be easier, because these type of battery benefits are 
local. Many of the NIMBY concerns over new transmission 
infrastructure would diminish since batteries would reduce the 
need for large transmission lines running through people’s lands. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Texas’s electricity structure avoids many of the problems 
inherent in many other markets across the country. Most 
importantly, the entire Texas transmission grid is located in the 
state.204 Therefore, the federal government cannot make any 
dormant Commerce Clause claim or federal preemption argument 
about the interstate wholesale market. Also, because any 
infrastructure would wholly serve the state, any new facility would 
satisfy the qualifications of “need” for generation and transmission 
siting established by the legislature. Texas is the most deregulated 
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state in the country regarding energy.205 Consumers only pay for 
the energy delivered, which does not include any charge for 
additional capacity.206 Furthermore, an RTO oversees equal and 
transparent access to the transmission grid.207 Its oversight ensures 
any different type of generation has access to selling their energy. 
Batteries can help bring the large amount of renewables online, as 
Texas already has exceeded its renewable goal of 10,000 MW of 
renewable energy capacity by 2025.208 
The Texas utility regulatory structure effectively allows all the 
costs and benefits to flow to those making the decisions, and thus 
avoids all the complications listed above associated with a 
mismatch between the electric regulatory structure and the 
electricity market. The utility market stakeholders in Texas can 
fully measure any investment they make into the grid. Texas could 
prove a prime market for the fledging battery technology. 
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